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Policy, Uniformity, Discretion, and Congress’s
Sentencing Acid Trip
Mark Osler ∗
I. THE POINTLESS FOREST AND THE POINTLESS MAN
Around 1970, singer Harry Nilsson went on an acid trip. He
later reported that during this experience, he “looked at the trees
and . . . realized that they all came to points, and the little branches
came to points, and the houses came to a point. [He] thought ‘Oh!
Everything has a point, and if it doesn’t, then there’s a point to it.’”1
Nilsson put these insights to good use, later producing an album
and an animated film, both entitled The Point!.2 In either format, The
Point! tells the story of Oblio, who along with his dog, Arrow, is
thrown out of the land of Point because Oblio does not have a point
on top of his head like everyone else. They are banished to the scary
Pointless Forest, where they encounter the Pointless Man, another
banished soul who welcomes them as they begin their journey. The
Pointless Man, as drawn, has several pointy faces and actual arrows
emanating from his torso, all pointing in different directions.
Once Oblio enters the Pointless Forest and actually meets the socalled Pointless Man, Oblio has a radical change in perspective: “You
see the Pointless Man did have a point; in fact, he had hundreds of
them, all pointing in different directions. But as he so quickly
pointed out, ‘A point in every direction is the same as no point at
all.’”3
Which (of course) brings us to Congress and federal sentencing.
Congress has issued at least thirty-one separate directives setting

∗
Professor of Law, Baylor Law School; B.A. 1985, College of William and Mary; J.D.
1990, Yale Law School. I would like to thank Craig Pankratz for his extensive help in
researching this Article.
1. HARRY NILSSON, THE POINT! (BMG Entm’t Jan. 1971), available at
http://www.harrynilsson.com/page-the-point.html.
2. The animated version was televised by ABC on February 2, 1971, and was narrated
by Dustin Hoffman. Later narrators on subsequent versions included Alan Thicke and Ringo
Starr. Id.
3. HARRY NILSSON, The Pointless Man, on THE POINT! (BMG Entm’t Jan. 1971).
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general policy goals in criminal sentencing.4 While each of these
policy goals has an individual purpose, when taken together they are
4. Those thirty-one directives mandate that each of the following be considered in
creating guidelines, sentencing individuals, or both:
1) The nature of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2004).
2) The circumstances of the offense. Id.
3) The history of the defendant. Id.
4) The characteristics of the defendant. Id.
5) The seriousness of the offense. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
6) Promotion of respect for the law. Id.
7) Just punishment for the offense. Id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1, pt.
A, ¶ 2, introductory cmt. (2007).
8) Deterrence to criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (2004); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1, pt. A, ¶ 2, introductory cmt. (2007).
9) Protection of the public from further crimes by the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C)
(2004).
10) To provide defendants with needed education or vocational training. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
11) To provide defendants with needed medical care or other correctional treatment. Id.
12) The kinds of sentences available. Id. § 3553(a)(3).
13) Policy statements by the Sentencing Commission. Id. § 3553(a)(5).
14) The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records
found guilty of similar conduct. Id. § 3553(a)(6); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
1A1.1, pt. A, ¶ 2, introductory cmt. (2007).
15) Provision of restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7) (2004).
16) Incapacitating the offender. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1, pt. A, ¶ 2,
introductory cmt. (2007).
17) Rehabilitating the offender. Id.
18) Proportionality in sentencing for conduct of differing severity. Id.
19) Input from the Probation system, Judicial conference, DOJ, and Federal Defenders. 28
U.S.C. § 994(o) (2006).
20) Directions from Congress. Note following 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2006).
21) Maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted. 28
U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006).
22) Reflect advancements in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice
process. Id. § 991(b)(1)(C).
23) Neutrality as to race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders. 28
U.S.C. § 994(d) (2006).
24) Fairness in sentencing. Id. §§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(f).
25) Sentences need to be near the statutory maximum for crimes of violence or certain drug
offenses. Id. § 994(h).
26) Sentences need to allow for probation for certain first offenders. Id. § 994(j).
27) Average sentences prior to imposition of the Guidelines. Id. § 994(m).
28) Effect on prison populations. Id. § 994(q).
29) Certainty. Id. §§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(f).
30) The community view of the gravity of an offense. Id. § 994(c)(4).
31) The current incidence of an offense in the community and nation as a whole. Id. §
994(c)(7).
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as pointless as the Pointless Man. This Article contends that the
federal sentence guidelines are directed in too many ways at the same
time; as a result they reflect conflicting policies and have no moral
center. The guidelines should be rewritten in accordance with a few
well-articulated policy goals.
Part II considers some of these thirty-one policy directives, which
all point in different directions with different degrees of specificity,
clarity, and import. In setting out what some of these policy
directives seek, it becomes clear that federal sentencing policy
resembles nothing so much as Nilsson’s Pointless Man.
Part III, in turn, describes some of the underlying conflicts
between these principles. It then describes the effect of combining a
thirty-one-point policy directive together with a strong mandate for
uniformity. This project—putting a pointless mish-mash of policy
directives together with a demand for uniform punishments—does
not make much sense. Without a clear policy goal, uniformity is as
likely to be uniformly wrong as it is to be uniformly right relative to
any understandable principle or set of principles. What is the sense in
having consistent and uniform sentencing if it is consistently and
uniformly wrong? To insist on uniformity without principled
directives to create those uniform results does nothing less than rob
sentencing of any sense of real authority by making it morally
indeterminate.5
Finally, Part IV suggests a do-over for federal sentencing, in
which a new Sentencing Commission would start with a small
number of reasonable policy goals and then re-make the guidelines
in a way that meets those goals. Opponents to re-making the
guidelines would no doubt (justifiably) fear the specter of greater
discretion for judges being a feature of any new system. This “fear of
judging,” as Stith and Cabranes called it,6 is our modern equivalent
of the Pointless Forest—we (through our legislators) are scared to
5. An analogy to denominational religion may help an understanding of the oddity of
this combination. Those faiths most judgmental of moral behavior tend to be those with a
defined set of core beliefs that are maintained by a magisterium. On the other hand, those
faiths that embrace a wide variety of beliefs (such as the Bahá’í or Unitarian/Universalists)
tend to be more tolerant of a wide variety of behavior and belief. The current federal
sentencing system turns this on its head—it is as if the Unitarian/Universalists, despite
tolerating a wide array of moral principles, were suddenly harshly judgmental of those who
violated the tenets of any faith.
6. KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998).
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enter a world where judges exercise independent discretion because
we do not know everything that may lie in wait for us there. After all,
individuals, even individual judges chosen expressly for their superior
discretion and judgment, can be unpredictable. Given the
pointlessness of current “policy,” however, the prospect of reformed
guidelines with individual judges more actively evaluating cases
becomes more appealing. With a new system and more empowered
judges exercising a greater degree of judicial discretion, there would
be a much better chance that policy and outcome would match.
II. A POINT IN EVERY DIRECTION IS THE SAME AS NO POINT AT
ALL
A. It Used to be Simple
The policy goals of federal sentencing used to be simple. As
continues to be true in many other nations,7 four simple goals
structured United States sentencing.8 These four goals shifted in
importance over time relative to one another, but as a whole
remained constant. One advantage to this framework was that the
goals of sentencing were easily understood. They simply sought to
(1) punish offenders (retribution), (2) deter both the offender and
others from committing further crimes (deterrence), (3) incapacitate
dangerous individuals so they could not cause more harm
(incapacitation), and (4) rehabilitate some offenders for both their
benefit and that of the larger society (rehabilitation).
Certainly, these four traditional goals were often in tension.9 For
example, some might insist that incapacitation of the defendant
through imprisonment is necessary in a given case to protect the
community; meanwhile, others might insist that rehabilitation is
possible. These goals would be served by different means: prison for
the former and treatment for the latter. Despite such tensions, these

7. See Andrew Dubinsky, Note, An Examination of International Sentencing
Guidelines and a Proposal for Amendments to the International Criminal Court’s Sentencing
Structure, 33 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 609, 618–19 (2007) (discussing the
goals of punishment considered by the International Criminal Court).
8. See Patricia M. Wald, Why Focus on Women Offenders?, 16 CRIM. JUST. 10, 11
(2001); Dubinsky, supra note 7, at 618–19..
9. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 9–22 (describing the conflicts between and
changing roles of these sentencing goals in American history).
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limited goals allowed judges to weigh them relative to one another
and evaluate each defendant by the same standards.
On a macro level, the simplicity of these traditional goals also
allowed for a national debate over which goal should predominate,
and the goals shifted in importance over time. For example,
beginning in the late nineteenth century the goal of rehabilitation
was ascendant.10 As Doug Berman has noted, this rehabilitative ideal
was framed in medical terms, with the criminal viewed as “sick” and
in need of a “cure.”11 The traditional goals, then, provided not only
reasonable guideposts for the use of discretion, but framed the
national debate on sentencing in an understandable way, with a
known and limited number of trade-offs available.
These goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation still remain in the federal scheme, at least in the sense
they are listed in the statute book. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3553
directs a judge to consider the need for a sentence to reflect “just
punishment,”12 to provide “adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct,”13 “to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant,”14 and “to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner.”15
Unfortunately, Congress did not stop there. While the policy
goals encompassed within retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation remain in the books, they have been buried
beneath an avalanche of other goals, including (perhaps most
importantly) uniformity. While I have previously addressed the sad
fact that the federal sentencing guidelines wholly ignore these goals
in the machinery it establishes to calculate a sentence,16 this Article
addresses a related but different question: Has the wide variety of

10. See Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 3
(2005).
11. Id. at 4.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2004).
13. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
14. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
15. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
16. See Mark Osler, Must Have Got Lost: Traditional Sentencing Goals, the False Trail of
Uniformity and Process, and the Way Back Home, 54 S.C. L. REV. 649, 654–56 (2003); Mark
Osler, Uniformity and Traditional Sentencing Goals in the Age of Feeney, 16 FED. SENT’G REP.
253, 253–54 (2004), quoted in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 296 n.15 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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diverse policy goals packed into the federal sentencing system made
that system morally indeterminate?
B. The Non-Traditional Policy Goals
In addition to the traditional policy goals that are buried in
federal sentencing policy, Congress has articulated several other
policy directives. These are directed to the Sentencing Commission
and judges, both of which have roles in turning policy into action—
the Sentencing Commission through creation and revision of the
sentencing guidelines and judges through the act of sentencing itself.
Even though the directives were largely enacted together
through the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, these directives for
sentencing, sadly, are not grouped together in the federal code.17
Rather, they are lumped together in three separate places, leading to
frequent redundancies and confusion, all of which adds to the
controversy attached to the guidelines. One of those places is 18
U.S.C. § 3553, which has been at the center of nearly every federal
sentencing controversy since United States v. Booker.18 In Booker, the
Supreme Court declared that the sentencing guidelines were no
longer strictly mandatory and that § 3553 was to be the guiding
statute of sentencing judges and courts of appeals.19 Though § 3553
itself seems clearly directed to sentencing judges and not to the
Sentencing Commission,20 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) in turn directs the
Sentencing Commission to consider some of those same objectives.21
As Justice Breyer somewhat famously stated in Rita v. United
States,22 “the sentencing statutes envision both the sentencing judge
and the Commission as carrying out the same basic § 3553(a)
objectives, the one, at retail, the other at wholesale.”23 That is, while
the judge applies these standards to individual defendants, the

17. For a worthwhile history of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, see Kristin J.
Balding, Comment, It Is a ‘War On Drugs’ and It Is Time to Reload Our Weapons: An
Interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1449 (1999).
18. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
19. Id. at 259–60.
20. For example, the key provisions included at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) are prefaced with
“The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider.”
21. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) directs the Sentencing Commission to
“assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2).”
22. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
23. Id. at 2463.
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Sentencing Commission applies them broadly in directing the
judges.
Though 18 U.S.C. § 3553 contains the best-known set of
sentencing policy goals, it by no means contains the only set. The
statute that established the Sentencing Commission itself, 28 U.S.C.
§ 991, contains not only specific sentencing policy goals,24 but also a
sweeping description of how the guidelines as a whole should look:
The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission
are to . . . . provide certainty and fairness in meeting the
purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing
disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while
maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized
sentences when warranted . . . .25
The real mother lode of policy goals, though, is found in 28
U.S.C. § 994, which is directed at the Sentencing Commission and
sets out with both great specificity26 and stunning breadth27 that
which should be contained in the guidelines.
Split into three distinct statutes, the policy goals taken as a whole
suffer from redundancy and overlap in several places. To avoid
replicating those problems and to provide a clearer analysis, I have
grouped some of the sentencing policy goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553,
28 U.S.C. § 991, and 28 U.S.C. § 994 into three categories. First,
there are the broad dictates, which focus sentencing in a general way
on interests other than the traditional goals, and which on their face
should be considered in all federal sentencings. Second, there are
specific provisions that require the consideration of certain discrete
factors in sentencing defined types of cases. Third, federal law
contains at least two statutes that might be called “trap-door”
provisions, directing judges and the Commission to obey unnamed
existing and yet-uncreated policy dictates.

24. For example, that statute’s requirement that sentencing guidelines “reflect, to the
extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal
justice process.” 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C) (2006).
25. Id. § 991(b), (b)(1)(B).
26. E.g., that consecutive sentences for both an offense and conspiracy to commit that
offense should be avoided. 28 U.S.C. § 994(l)(1)(B), 994(I)(2) (2006).
27. For example, these directives echo the others in seeking “fairness.” Id. at § 994(f).
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1. Broad dictates
The broad-dictate provisions of federal law direct sentencing
towards general goals rather than specific objectives. This group
includes several broader goals that in many cases undercut the four
traditional goals including: uniformity; parsimony; following
advancements in the science of human behavior, neutrality as to race,
sex, national origin, creed, and socio-economic status; fairness;
consistency with prior practices; certainty; the need to reflect
community beliefs; consideration of the commonality of offenses;
and the effect of the guidelines on prison populations.28
a. Uniformity. Perhaps the most commonly recognized nontraditional goal of sentencing is uniformity, which is codified as part
of the long list found at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).29 In mandating
sentencing guidelines, Congress sought, above all else, uniformity
among judges and within a judge’s own docket in sentencing similar
cases.30 As discussed in Part III at some length, the Department of
Justice and some members of Congress straightforwardly declared
uniformity as the paramount goal of the sentencing system. Indeed,
it is fair to say that it is the pursuit of this goal of uniformity that has
driven the restructuring of the federal sentencing system31 through
guidelines, mandatory minimum sentences, and courts of appeals’
opinions on what is “reasonable” under United States v. Booker.32
b. Parsimony.33 What is commonly called the “parsimony clause”
of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) provides that “[t]he court shall impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with
the purposes set forth in . . . this subsection . . . .” This directive sets
out a clear principle: a sentence should not exceed what is necessary

28. For a more complete list, see supra note 4. This list omits for the sake of efficiency
some important codified principles that also create conflict, such as the principle of
proportionality.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2004).
30. As Stith and Cabranes described it, “Congress’s concern with reducing perceived or
assumed disparities in federal sentencing is reflected in the debates leading up to the Act’s
passage, in the Senate report accompanying it, and in the text of the Act itself.” STITH &
CABRANES, supra note 6, at 104.
31. See Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74
U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 756–91 (2006).
32. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2004).
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to fulfill codified factors, which include the traditional goals of
retribution,34 deterrence,35 incapacitation,36 and rehabilitation.37
Unfortunately, post-guideline courts have rarely tried to give the
parsimony clause much meaning.38 It is not surprising that these
courts have tended to ignore the parsimony clause, as trial courts
generally follow the sentencing guidelines, which serve a multitude
of other goals (and sometimes, seemingly, no goal at all). The
guidelines are simply not calibrated to follow the simple parsimony
directive, as Justice Breyer seemed to acknowledge in Rita v. United
States.39 In that opinion, Justice Breyer noted that in the course of
trying to use the four traditional goals and the parsimony provision
to arrive at a foundational set of guidelines, a conflict arose among
those drafting the guidelines “when the Commission attempted to
reconcile the differing perceptions of the purposes of criminal
punishment.”40 Rather than resolving this conflict, the Commission
simply punted on the issue by codifying past practices and averaging
out the results from thousands of prior cases.41 Thus, the
Commission tossed out any real consideration of the parsimony
provision as one of the structuring mechanisms for the guidelines.
Yet, at the same time, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) affirmatively directed
that judges consider the parsimony provision in sentencing individual
defendants.
Since the guidelines were developed without active reference to
parsimony, the guidelines constantly conflicted with a sentencing
judge’s attempt to use the parsimony provision as it applied to any
specific case. Nevertheless, judges were both bound to the guidelines

34. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
35. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
36. Id. (a)(2)(C).
37. Id. (a)(2)(D).
38. It is important to distinguish the principle of parsimony from the rule of lenity,
which historically has little to do with sentencing. Rather, the rule of lenity is a rule of
statutory construction which insists that application of a criminal statute be construed in favor
of a defendant when it is unclear whether or not that law applies to the defendant’s actions at
all. See Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 511–12
(2002).
39. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
40. Id. at 2464 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, intro. 3
(2007)).
41. Id.
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and charged with employing parsimony.42 These conflicts have
continued even after the ruling in Booker that the guidelines were no
longer mandatory, and it is likely that these conflicts will be litigated
in the future as courts resolve what type of application of the
parsimony clause is “reasonable.”43 While courts may have afforded
little significance to the parsimony clause at some point in the past,
more recent Supreme Court decisions point in the other direction.44
In the future, parsimony will likely step up among the many other
provisions competing for attention from the Sentencing Commission
and judges.
c. Following advancements in knowledge of human behavior.45 One
of Congress’s principal directives to the Sentencing Commission was
to establish policies that “reflect, to the extent practicable,
advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the
criminal justice process.”46 On its face, this directive tells the
Commission that it must monitor scientific progress such as the
development of new therapies that may promote rehabilitation.
This has rarely occurred, which should not be surprising. Frank
Bowman argues persuasively that the guidelines themselves are not
only unscientific, but also constitute “a reaction against the notion
that science has very much to say about criminal punishment.”47 In a
broad sense, this is absolutely correct. The available history of the
development of the guidelines reflects no substantive reference by
the framers of the guidelines to the social or biological sciences.
However, in some instances the Sentencing Commission itself has
developed policies that rely on specific scientific findings. One such
instance involves crack cocaine sentencing, in which two decades
after adopting an unscientific approach the Commission reversed
course based on scientific data.48

42. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007); Gall v. United States,
128 S. Ct. 586, 589–90 (2007) (arising out of this foundational conflict between, on the one
hand, the traditional goals and the parsimony provision as applied by a judge and, on the
other, the sentencing guidelines).
43. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 590.
44. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 564.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C) (2006).
46. Id.
47. Frank O. Bowman, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 316 (2000).
48. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg. 28558, 28571–72
(May 21, 2007).
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In developing the sentencing guidelines for crack cocaine, the
Sentencing Commission adopted the one-hundred-to-one powderto-crack cocaine ratio contained in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b),49 even
though that ratio had no scientific foundation.50 In 200251 and in
2007,52 the Commission issued lengthy reports that relied on current
scientific studies to refute its own one-hundred-to-one ratio.53 In
2007, the Commission ultimately adjusted that ratio in the
guidelines based in part on the findings in its own report.54 The
Commission made the adjustment despite the fact that Congress had
taken no action to change that ratio as contained in the
corresponding set of mandatory minimum sentences.55
While some commentators and legal experts may dismiss the
imperative of considering new science as toothless, in at least one
high-profile sentencing realm (cocaine-related offenses), it has played
a role in a major change.
d. Neutrality as to race, sex, national origin, creed, and
socioeconomic status.56 In one of the few absolutes among the
directives by Congress, 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) mandates that “[t]he
Commission shall assure that the guidelines and policy statements are
entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and
socioeconomic status of offenders.” In turn, the Commission placed
equally strong language in the guidelines themselves, providing flatly
that race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socioeconomic
status of a defendant are all factors that “are not relevant in the
determination of a sentence.”57

49. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) creates mandatory minimum sentences which treat trafficking in
one hundred grams of powder cocaine the same as trafficking just one gram of crack cocaine.
50. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY app. at B–5 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 COMM’N REPORT], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/cocaine2007.pdf.
51. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY, 21–29 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/
02crack/2002crackrpt.htm.
52. 2007 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 50.
53. For example, the 2007 Report refutes the idea that crack cocaine affects fetal
development disproportionately relative to powder cocaine. 2007 COMM’N REPORT, supra
note 50, at 58–61.
54. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 48.
55. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2000).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2006).
57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.10 (2007).
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The breadth of this prohibition is striking. Though it is
contained within the chapter of the guidelines that describes
departures from a guideline range,58 the language of this rule is
distinct from surrounding guidelines, all of which limit their effects
to departure considerations.59 In contrast, the prohibition against
consideration of race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and
socioeconomic status applies to all aspects of determining a
sentence—including the establishment of a sentence within a
guideline range. In other words, by the plain language of the
guideline, it is improper for a sentencing judge to even consider the
fact that the defendant is female when sentencing within a guideline
range.
This absolutist nature of the rule of neutrality has brought the
race/sex/national-origin/creed/religion/socioeconomic status ban
into conflict with other policy directives. For example, the mandate
to follow current science (discussed above) runs into a wall when it
conflicts with the bar on consideration of these factors. Specifically,
the idea of whether such science mandates consideration of a
defendant’s sex is an actively debated question. In relation to female
offenders, for example, some have employed reams of data to oppose
the ban on taking gender into account when sentencing, arguing
that this masks important and relevant gender factors that pervade
society as a whole.60
The strict bar on considering protected class status continues to
have a strong impact on sentencing, even as it comes under harsher
attack from those who would bend this rule to allow for certain
factors (such as gender) to be taken into account.61

58. Id. §5.
59. E.g., id. § 5H1.5 (“Employment record is not ordinarily relevant in determining
whether a departure is warranted.”).
60. See e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women,
and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
20 PEPP. L. REV. 905, 908 (1993). Using criminological data to back up her point, Raeder
argues that “[t]reating men and women fungibly for sentencing purposes overlooks the role
played by gender in criminality.” Id.; see also Nekima Levy-Pounds, From the Frying Pan into
the Fire: How Poor Women of Color and Children Are Affected by Sentencing Guidelines and
Mandatory Minimums, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 285, 286 (2007) (“[T]his approach has
virtually ignored the disparate impact of the sentencing statutes on arguably the most
vulnerable members of society—poor women of color and their children.”).
61. Despite the ban on considering gender, there does seem to be gender effects in
sentencing, with women getting lighter sentences than similarly situated men. Anne Martin
Stacey & Cassia Spohn, Gender and the Social Costs of Sentencing: An Analysis of Sentences
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e. Fairness.62 Fairness, mandated as a part of the guideline scheme
at both 28 U.S.C. §§ 991 and 994, seems so vague a concept that
we might imagine it has not been a substantive policy issue in the
grand debates over sentencing. However, as the Federal Sentencing
Commission formed the guidelines, the Commission gave “fairness”
two contradictory but precise meanings, and each plays a role in how
the guidelines are constructed.
In recounting the creation of the sentencing guidelines’
structure, now-Justice Stephen Breyer spoke quite clearly about
some of the compromises made by the first Sentencing
Commission.63 In that discussion, Breyer described fairness in two
clear but opposing ways—first, in terms of procedural fairness and
second, as substantive fairness.64
To Breyer, procedural unfairness results when a judge determines
facts that enhance a sentence in an informal way. For example,
without jury determinations, the rules of evidence, or the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.65 As Breyer puts it,
“the more facts the court must find in this informal way, the more
unwieldy the process becomes, and the less fair that process appears
to be.”66 Intriguingly, each of these shortcomings became a feature
of the sentencing system, and they are at the core of the issues raised
in Booker and its progeny.
On the other hand, Breyer appears to believe that allowing the
judge to adjust the range to account for “real” offense conduct (that
is, acts beyond those charged in an indictment or information),
almost always with a higher sentence, provides “substantive” fairness
by allowing the punishment to fit the real crime.67 By including this
principle in the sentencing scheme, the courts have given rise to

Imposed on Male and Female Offenders in Three U.S. District Courts, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L.
43, 48–49, 73–76 (2006).
62. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(f) (2006).
63. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988).
64. Id. at 8–12.
65. Id. at 10–11.
66. Id. at 11.
67. Id. at 11–12.
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controversial features such as sentencing a defendant under the
guidelines for crimes for which the defendant has been acquitted.68
In the end, according to Breyer, the Commission compromised
between these two types of fairness, essentially by allowing a limited
version of both to play a role.69 The Commission’s compromise
resulted in a number of troubling features in the guidelines,
including the lack of jury findings, which brought us to Booker, and
the crucial effect of relevant conduct in calculating a sentence.70 Far
from being meaningless, the principle of “fairness” played a major
role in shaping federal sentencing. In fact, it can be safely said that
the Commission’s failure to give the idea of “fairness” a single and
unique meaning within the mandated sentencing goals at the time
the guidelines were framed (and thus requiring a “compromise”) was
a major causal factor of the disruption within federal sentencing that
we have experienced through Booker and its progeny.
f. Consistency with prior practices.71 Congress directed the
Commission to first survey the then-current sentences being given,
and then to create guidelines that reject those averages and instead
establish guideline ranges that “accurately reflect the seriousness of
the offense.”72 In 28 U.S.C. § 994(m), Congress described this very
specific mandate to the Sentencing Commission:
The Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the
fact that, in many cases, current sentences do not accurately
reflect the seriousness of the offense. This will require that, as
a starting point in its development of the initial sets of
guidelines for particular categories of cases, the Commission
ascertain the average sentences imposed in such categories of
cases prior to the creation of the Commission . . . .73

68. See United States v. Lynch, 437 F.3d 902, 916 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“The
Supreme Court has held that a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court
from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge.”).
69. Breyer, supra note 63, at 11–12.
70. The guidelines expressly direct a court to consider uncharged “relevant conduct” in
calculating a guideline sentence, which means that acts never charged will be the basis of
sentencing if they are found to have been committed by the judge under a mere
preponderance standard. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2007).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2006).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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Indeed, Congress directly told the Sentencing Commission to
ascertain the collective judgment of hundreds of experienced judges
and to substitute it with their own.
It is beyond dispute that the Commission did exactly that, in an
imprecise, contentious, and hurried way.74 First, the Commission
gathered data on past practices. Experts in statistical analysis,
however, have criticized the Commission’s methods. These experts
contend that these methods did not meet social science standards,
focused on a small number of relevant variables, and were shrouded
in mystery even to those with an expertise in such analysis.75
Having gathered and analyzed this data, the Commission
followed Congress’s mandate to reject the content of that data.
Among other adjustments from prior practice, the Commission
significantly raised sentences under the guidelines for violent crimes,
white-collar crimes, and narcotics crimes.76
It is hard to underestimate the profound impact or bizarre nature
of the task given the Sentencing Commission: to assess then reject
accumulated wisdom. The first step, a comprehensive study of
existing practices, certainly makes sense. The second step, however,
seems inexplicable—not to consider those prior practices, or hold
them up against an objective standard, but rather to reject them. A
single obscure command from Congress told the Commission both
to gather data for the first time, draw a specific conclusion about that
data (that it represents under-punishment of some crimes), and to
take action on that fore-drawn conclusion (raise sentences for those
crimes). This process is bizarre not only in that it is devoid of respect
for social science, but it also negates any consideration of the many
other sentencing goals Congress mandated at the same time. The
directive to assess current practice and crank it up a notch does not
take into account parsimony, has nothing to do with science,
probably incorporates sexist and racist assumptions, and reflects
neither procedural nor substantive fairness. It was, however,
relatively easy to do.

74. See Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne’er-Do-Well to the Criminal History Category:
The Refinement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99,
122–23 (2003) (“The final draft was written at a late date in some haste to meet the
submission deadline.”), quoted in MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 88 (1996).
75. Harcourt, supra note 74, at 99, 123.
76. Id. at 125–26.
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g. Certainty.77 In the sense the guidelines made sentencing more
predictable and “certain” from the perspective of a defendant being
sentenced, the very act of creating guidelines in part fulfilled the
mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B), which required the
Sentencing Commission to establish policies and practices that
provide “certainty” in meeting the purposes of sentencing. Justice
Breyer called this factor “honesty,” and described it as one in which
“the sentence the judge gives is the sentence the offender will serve
. . . .”78 It is noteworthy, however, that the elimination of parole and
drastic reductions in “good time” credit to those who had already
been sentenced have been even more significant to the achievement
of certainty than the sentencing guidelines.
This project as a whole is perhaps best understood through the
guidelines’ own description of “The Basic Approach.”79 There, the
Commission explained its understanding of such certainty, relative to
the regime it replaced:
Congress first sought honesty in sentencing. It sought to
avoid the confusion and implicit deception that arises out of
the present sentencing system which requires a judge to
impose an indeterminate sentence that is automatically
reduced in most cases by “good time” credits. In addition,
the parole commission is permitted to determine how much
of the remainder of any prison sentence an offender actually
will serve.80
Eliminating parole81 and limiting “good time” credit to fifteen
percent of the total sentence,82 while not directly related to the
guidelines, nonetheless had an impact on the operation of the
guidelines and the problems that resulted. By determining the term
of imprisonment in whole at the time of sentencing (rather than
being subject to later revision by parole boards and the Bureau of
Prisons), the sentence issued in the judgment became more
important. Thus a sentence’s distortions and anomalies, including
those caused by the confusion cloud of policy goals discussed in this
Article, were amplified.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
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28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(f) (2006).
Breyer, supra note 63, at 4.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1(A)(3) (2007).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3624(a) (2006).
Id. § 3624(b).
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Where there were previously multiple opportunities to achieve
the goals of sentencing, the elimination of parole and “good time”
meant that now there was only one—the sentencing itself. Without
the possible mitigating effects of parole and good time, only the
courtroom judge (and the Sentencing Commission directing the
judge via the guidelines) was left to directly effectuate the many and
conflicting goals of sentencing articulated by Congress.
h. Reflecting community beliefs.83 Among the many sentencing
goals that promote national standards and uniformity, there is a
striking anomaly: 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4) directs that the guidelines
shall take into account to the extent it is relevant “the community
view of the gravity of the offense.”84 While this goal is not explicitly
reflected in the guidelines themselves, the guidelines’ structure and
related statutes provide a great deal of discretion to localized federal
prosecutors. Stephanos Bibas has chronicled the significance of these
local variations through prosecutorial discretion,85 which the
Sentencing Commission has continued to allow. For example, Bibas
specifically describes significant variations in the way that different
federal prosecutors employ substantial assistance departures.86 Such
localized variations, of course, undermine many of the other goals
described here. Most obviously, they cuts against uniformity, the
goal some legal experts and scholars see as first among many.87
i. Commonality of the offense.88 The Commission is charged in 28
U.S.C. § 994(c)(7) with crafting guidelines that take into account
(where relevant) “the current incidence of the offense in the
community and in the Nation as a whole.” Admittedly, the
Commission has certainly followed this instruction, at least when the
Commission reacts to the emergence of a new narcotic. Often, this
has been in response to a direct Congressional directive. This
dynamic is exemplified by the Commission’s recent treatment of
anabolic steroids.

83. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4) (2006).
84. Id.
85. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 137 (2005).
86. Id. at 148–53.
87. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 104 (“Reduction of ‘unwarranted sentencing
disparities’ was a—probably the—goal of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.”).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(7) (2006).
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In February 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft personally
announced the indictment of several men connected with the
BALCO lab in San Francisco who were charged with making and
selling steroids.89 President Bush even denounced steroid use in his
State of the Union address that year,90 and subsequently Senator
John McCain and others promoted bills in Congress that would
require mandatory uniform testing of professional athletes for the
use of anabolic steroids.91 Clearly, the nation’s politicians perceived a
growing epidemic of steroid use.
Consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(7), Congress then directed
the United States Sentencing Commission to consider an increase to
the amount of prison time required under the steroid guidelines.92
The Sentencing Commission took this advice and acted by bumping
up the guidelines’ sentence for a given amount of steroids.93
Whether or not there was an upsurge of steroid use around 2004,
the guidelines reacted to the perception that there was such a relevant
change in the commonality of that particular type of drug abuse.
Indeed, the Commission’s actions in increasing prison time for
steroid offenses reflect yet another Congressional directive to
sentencing.
j. Effect on prison populations.94 When the Sentencing
Commission first created the guidelines, Congress ordered that the
Commission, in conjunction with the Bureau of Prisons, report to
Congress on the “maximum utilization of resources to deal
effectively with the Federal prison population.”95 This implies, at
least, that the Commission is directed to impose guidelines with an
eye to the effect that the guidelines will have on prison
populations—that is, to avoid the need for a prison-building binge
due to the impact of sentencing guidelines.

89. See Richard D. Collins, Of Ballparks and Jail Yards: Pumping Up the War on
Steroids, 30 CHAMPION 22 (2006).
90. See id.
91. Lindsay J. Taylor, Congressional Attempts to “Strike Out” Steroids: Constitutional
Concerns About the Clean Sports Act, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 961, 961–62 (2007).
92. Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-358, 118 Stat. 1661, § 3
(2004) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 802, 811 (2004)).
93. The Commission achieved this increase by adjusting the dosage amount for steroids.
Collins, supra note 89, at 23.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 994(q) (2006).
95. Id.
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It is unclear that this implication has had much effect. Prior to
the guidelines, about four in ten federal offenders went to prison.96
By 2006, that number was 9.5 out of 10.97 Twenty-some years down
the guideline path, nearly all defendants are going to prison.
Predictably, the federal prison population shot up. In 1984, there
were 32,317 people in federal prisons.98 By 1992, that figure had
doubled, and in 2007 the federal prison population stood at a
shocking 198,65699—six times the population at the time the
Commission created the guidelines.
Unlike the other broad directives discussed above, it appears that
the mandate to consider prison populations had little direct effect on
the guidelines themselves. However, while there has been no
significant effect on the guidelines,100 the directive to consider prison
populations may have been influential in other ways. Indeed, it is
possible that the Commission’s reports have deterred Congress from
passing some laws that might have had a drastic effect on prison
populations. For example, in analyzing the proposed Gang
Deterrence and Community Protection Act of 2007, the
Commission reported that the act would create the need for nine
billion dollars to construct about 23,600 additional prison beds.101 It
is easy to imagine that during tough economic times, the
Commission’s reports dampened the chances for the passage of that
bill.

96. See Timothy P. Cadigan, Pretrial Services in the Federal System: Impact of the Pretrial
Services Act of 1982, 71 FED. PROBATION 10, 13 (2007).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Guideline changes have increased sentences relentlessly, despite the directive to keep
prison populations stable. From 1988 (the beginning of the guideline era) until 1999, for
example, the percentage of federal defendants sent to prison pursuant to the guidelines
increased from 54% to 72%. By 2003, this rate was up to 83.3%. Nora V. Demleitner, Smart
Public Policy: Replacing Imprisonment with Targeted Nonprison Sentences and Collateral
Sanctions, 58 STAN. L. REV. 339, 340 & n.4 (2005).
101. Tiffany Sykes, Note, Much Ado About Something: Reconciling Roper v. Simmons
with the Gang Deterrence and Community Protection Act of 2007 and the Possibility of
Inconsistent Jurisprudence, 34 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 163, 171 (2008)
(citing Jeffery A. Kidder, Gang Deterrence and the Community Protection Act of 2005: Why the
Federal Response to MS-13 is Flawed and How it Will Have an Adverse Impact on Your State, 33
NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 639, 648 n.85 (2007)).
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2. Specific provisions
Unlike the broad dictates (group one) and the trap-door
provisions (group three), the second group of policy goals contains
specific provisions, which require the consideration of discrete factors
under certain circumstances. This section addresses some of
Congress’s policy goals that apply only to certain types of cases.
Accordingly, this section discusses only a fraction of the total
number of these specific sentencing goals, namely, restitution, harsh
punishments for certain crimes, and rewarding cooperators.
a. Restitution. In concert with the creation of the guidelines,
Congress directed that a court in a case involving robbery, for
example, consider the need for the defendant to “provide restitution
to any victims of the offense.”102 The guidelines, consistent with the
statute,103 direct that the payment of restitution be required for the
full amount of the victim’s loss,104 even if restitution would reduce
the amount of a fine.105
Conceivably, this commitment to restitution would cut against
the need for a sentence of imprisonment, so that the defendant
would be free to work and earn money in order to pay off the
restitution amount. This tradeoff—disfavoring prison for probation
where restitution is possible—seems to be in tension with some of
the other principles articulated above, including the call to
uniformity106 and the ban on considering socioeconomic status.107
b. Harsh punishment for certain crimes.108 18 U.S.C. § 994(h)
created what we now know as the career-offender provisions of the
guidelines.109 These provisions advise harsh punishments for
defendants charged with drug crimes or crimes of violence and who
have at least two such prior convictions.110 These offenders receive a

102. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7) (2006).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 3572(b) (2006).
104. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.1(a) (2007).
105. Id. § 5E1.1(c).
106. There would be conflict because in otherwise similar cases, defendants with the
ability to pay would receive probation, while those with lesser job skills might end up in prison.
107. Presumably, socioeconomic status relates to earning power, which will equate to a
greater ability to pay restitution if the defendant receives a sentence of probation.
108. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2006).
109. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2007).
110. Id. § 4B1.1(a).
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stiff upward adjustment not only in their offense level score,111 but in
the other axis of the sentencing grid, the criminal history category,
regardless of their actual criminal history.112 Thus, an offender with
three minor drug trafficking offenses spread over two decades may
end up with a more severe sentence than some drug kingpins, such
as those who arrange for large amounts of narcotics to be brought
into the United States. As set out in the next section, this creates a
direct conflict with the competing principle of parsimony.113
c. Rewarding cooperators.114 Congress further mandated that the
guidelines encourage cooperation with the government through the
promise of lower sentences and the waiver of mandatory minimum
sentence provisions for those who provide the government with
“substantial assistance.”115 This mandate was fulfilled in the
guidelines through the provisions at section 5K1.1, which allow
downward departures for cooperators. These authorized departures
are now particularly important in federal criminal law, as they not
only are an essential tool for prosecutors, but the departures also
hold out for many defendants the only hope to escape harsh
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions.116
By making the breaks given to cooperators so important within
federal sentencing, Congress and the Commission sacrifice the hope
of fulfilling certain of the other principles they have set out.
Uniformity, of course, loses out, as does neutrality as to race and
socioeconomic class.117

111. Id. § 4B1.1(b). The sentencing guidelines arrive at a range of possible terms of
incarceration through a matrix which reflects on one axis the severity of the offense (the
“offense score”) and on the other axis the prior criminal convictions of the defendant (the
“criminal history category”).
112. Id.
113. See infra Part III.A.1.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (2006).
115. Id.
116. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006).
117. Those defendants with access to other defendants, often through bonds of race and
class, have the best chance of successfully getting a break for cooperating with federal
investigators. Many, though not all, conspiracies, for example, consist of members of one
ethnic group, meaning that only members of that group will have access to information and
the chance to cooperate.

313

OSLER.PP3

3/13/2009 9:18 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2009

3. Trap-door provisions
A final category of congressional requirement would be trapdoor provisions. These provisions allow for an unlimited number of
additional policy provisions to enter into the calculations that
supposedly determine a federal sentence. Federal law contains two
primary trap doors: (1) allowing Congress to introduce unforeseen
principles into the sentencing scheme through further directives118
and (2) allowing the Sentencing Commission to introduce new
directions.119 This allows both bodies to develop even more guiding
principles on the fly, as though the welter of provisions we already
have is insufficient.120
In a sense, the trap-door provisions may tell us more about the
problems with the federal sentencing project than anything else. Not
content with having created numerous distinct and competing policy
principles, Congress reserved the right to create even more policy
principles and inject them into an already confused and effectively
random system of sentencing.
III. THE PROBLEMS OF POINTLESSNESS AND UNIFORMITY
The listings above only describe less than half of the policies
embedded in federal sentencing statutes, but those described here
illustrate the flawed policy dynamic at work—one where so many
policy strands are knit together that the resulting fabric resembles
none of them. This Part first explores just a few of the resulting
conflicts within this mess, and then describes the effect of combining
this project with a consistent and unyielding desire (on the part of
Congress) for uniformity.
A. The Conflicts Within the Policy Swamp
While describing some of the policies involved in federal
sentencing and the guidelines, I have mentioned a few of the
conflicts created when these policy goals conflict. I would like now
to evaluate a few more in order to exemplify the workings of these
conflicts at ground level. I am able to describe only a small fraction
of the total conflicts; at some level, of course, each of the policy
118. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5) (2006).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5) (2006).
120. See supra Part II.B.1.i.
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goals opposes all the others for primacy in affecting the sentence of
any given defendant.121
1. Parsimony v. harsh punishment for certain offenders
The principle of parsimony, as described above,122 requires that a
sentence should be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to
comply with the traditional sentencing goals.123 Congress chose to
place this principle at the heart of its description of the sentencing
process.124
At the same time, however, Congress created the career-offender
provisions125 to help direct especially harsh sentences for those
convicted of a narcotics offense or violent crimes who also have two
prior convictions for drug trafficking or violent crimes.126 The careeroffender provision serves as a particularly blunt instrument since it
covers both drug kingpins and those who have three relatively minor
convictions for selling small amounts of narcotics.127
It is not hard to see how these two policies conflict.128 If the
career offender provision is followed, in many cases it will run
contrary to the parsimony provision, which requires more
individualized consideration. A good example of this conflict was
described in United States v. Fernandez,129 in which the district judge
considered a defendant who qualified as a career offender, based on
two relatively minor prior convictions.130 The judge in Fernandez
noted that the career-offender provisions applied but would double
the sentence.131 The judge then rejected the application of those
121. Tensions exist, of course, even within the original four goals of sentencing.
However, with a much more limited number of goals, those tensions can be much more easily
evaluated than with the huge number we wrestle with in the current system.
122. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
123. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
124. Id.
125. See supra Section II.B.2.b.
126. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(a) (2007).
127. Id.
128. The parsimony provision, of course, conflicts with a number of other policies as
well. For example, it conflicts with the directive to base the guidelines on prior experience,
which may not reflect parsimony. Parsimony also conflicts with the desire for guidelines to
reflect community beliefs, which may exaggerate the threat posed by a given category of crime
based on sensationalistic media reports.
129. 436 F. Supp. 2d 983 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
130. Id. at 987.
131. Id. at 990.
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provisions, as “the advisory guideline range was greater than
necessary to satisfy the purposes of sentencing.”132 Other judges
seem to be reaching the same conclusion,133 a result which, over
time, will erode the uniformity sought by the career-offender
provision.134
2. Neutrality v. consistency with prior sentencing practices
If the guidelines clearly state anything, it is that both the
guidelines themselves and sentencing judges are to be strictly neutral
as to race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status.135
Nonetheless, Congress decreed that the starting point for creating
the new guidelines be a survey of existing practices (which would
then be adjusted upward).136
In basing the guidelines on prior practices, the Commission
actually filtered those practices for racial, gender, and other
disparities. In other words, the guidelines, while expressing strict
neutrality, began with the simple step of building into the guidelines’
structure any bias and prejudice that may have existed in the
sentencing practices of the judges who were surveyed.137
3. Certainty v. rewarding cooperators
The federal sentencing scheme changed drastically at the time
the guidelines were first employed. This change was due in part to
the initial emphasis on certainty of sentencing at the time sentence is
announced, achieved in large part by eliminating parole and
diminishing the effect of “good time” credit.138 At the same time,
132. Id.
133. E.g., United States v. Ortiz, 502 F. Supp. 2d 712, 714 (N.D. Ohio 2007); United
States v. Vigorito, No. 4:04-CR-00011, 2007 WL 4125914, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 20,
2007).
134. One could argue that the erosion of one congressional mandate by judicial action is
not an inherent conflict, but rather a dialogue. Remember, however, that the provisions of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (including the parsimony provision) are meant as well to direct the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2006).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2006).
136. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2006).
137. One exception to this general observation is that the directive to adjust underpunished crimes (18 U.S.C. § 994(m)) was employed to raise sentences for white-collar
criminals and, as a result, may have countered a pre-existing bias in favor of the wealthy as a
socioeconomic group. See Breyer, supra note 63, at 20–23.
138. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006).
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Congress insisted that defendants who assist the prosecution be
rewarded for their efforts with a break in their sentences.139
The tension between these two directives comes from the fact
that many cooperators are rewarded with a break on their term of
incarceration after they are sentenced, as is authorized by Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). Thus, certainty at the time of
sentencing is undone. In fact, the amount of uncertainty created by
the resentencing of cooperators is exacerbated by the fact that the
guidelines do not restrict the size of a departure once the court has
found that the defendant provided “substantial assistance.”140 Thus,
the complete freedom of judges to alter the sentence as much as they
want gives them as much power as the parole board had before
parole was abolished.141
Needless to say, this Article has discussed just a thimbleful from
the swamp of conflicts created by the fact that at least thirty-one
policy goals fight for attention in the realm of federal sentencing.
The failure to articulate a reasonable set of goals robs the guideline
system of any hope of moral authority. There is no way to measure
success when so many factors are in play and in tension. By its
nature, a system with so many goals has the moral trajectory of a toy
boat in a baby pool being splashed by a group of toddlers. At the
heart of one of our most important governmental functions, we have
nothing less than moral relativism, where a virtually limitless set of
principles are at play with no sorting mechanism at hand.
B. The Dangerous Combination: Uniformity and Pointlessness
Federal sentencing policy is not a policy at all; it is a grab-bag of
too many ideas and priorities. On its own, this could be seen as
typical of congressional action in many areas where it creates an
administrative agency and then hands off power to that agency.
Congress is free in those circumstances to decree what is important
by laying out guiding principles, and then leave the messy work of
implementation to others—such is the structure of our government.
What is perhaps unusual about sentencing, though, is that in
139. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (2006).
140. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2007).
141. The analogy to a parole board is not a tight fit, of course, since the judge reviewing
a defendant’s assistance after sentencing will often be the same person who issued the initial
sentence, and looks to different criteria that a parole board would. The analogy is apposite only
in that certainty at the point in time of judgment is undermined.
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creating the guidelines and the Sentencing Commission, there was
also an overarching goal at work—the desire to achieve uniform
sentences from case to case and from judge to judge.142 To anyone
paying attention, it is perfectly clear that Congress’s primary
sentencing goal has been the same for the past twenty years:
eliminate disparities and create uniform sentences across the
nation.143
Congress has attempted to achieve this goal through the
imposition of sentencing guidelines, the passage of mandatory
minimum sentences,144 and the reporting of individual judges’
sentences to the United States Sentencing Commission for
evaluation.145 Intriguingly, within the debate over sentencing,
uniformity is consistently discussed as an end in itself rather than as a
tool to best fulfill other policies.146 The result, even after Booker, has
been the most restrictive sentencing system in the nation—one that
imposes more uniformity and restricts judicial discretion more
severely than any of the fifty state systems that overlap with federal
courts in their common project of regulating crime.147
Certainly, one can make the argument (and Albert Altschuler has
made it quite convincingly)148 that despite these efforts, uniformity
has not been achieved. Altschuler points out that regional disparities
tripled after the guidelines went into effect, rather than decreasing as
intended.149 He further argues that disparities as a whole increased in
the first fifteen years of the guidelines’ existence.150 In explaining this
unexpected result, Altschuler credibly points to the use of

142. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 104.
143. Id.
144. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006).
145. These reports are made within thirty days of the entry of judgment in every federal
case, and are mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1).
146. For example, in the Kimbrough opinion on crack cocaine sentencing, even while
acknowledging that Booker marked a departure from strict uniformity, the Supreme Court
simply stated without elaboration that “it is unquestioned that uniformity remains an
important goal of sentencing.” Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 573 (2007).
147. See Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV.
155 (2005).
148. Albert W. Altschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal
Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85 (2005).
149. Id. at 101.
150. Id.
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prosecutorial discretion in far different ways in different parts of the
country.151
Whether the desire for uniformity has been achieved, uniformity
would never have made sense in the first place unless those uniform
results were consistent with understandable, limited, and discrete
goals. The failure to articulate a simple set of goals before imposing
the machinery of uniformity (mandatory minimums and the current
federal guidelines) had two major effects. First, this failure robbed
the guidelines of a clear-cut measuring tool for success. Second, this
failure amplified the problems associated with the lack of a moral
compass described in the preceding section152 by prescribing bright
normative lines that are unmoored from a simple, understandable
moral anchor. In other words, the guidelines lack any
understandable purpose, yet are strongly directive.
1. The unmeasurable goals
Like a sports league for six-year-olds where the score is not kept
because it might make one of the teams feel bad, Congress has
created a system in which cause and effect cannot be measured,
which results in unaccountability. Having a huge number of
conflicting policy goals makes it almost impossible to measure the
success of progress towards any one of those goals.153 Even the goal
of uniformity, which should be simple to measure, seems not to have
worked out the way people hoped, or to be easy to measure.154 As
Amy Baron-Evans points out, fifteen years after the guidelines were
imposed, it was still unclear whether the increased severity of the
guidelines155 had accomplished any sentencing purpose.156 Thus we

151. Id. at 100−02. Stephanos Bibas describes in some detail the way in which this works
as to two components of judicial discretion—the use of fast-track programs and employment of
substantial assistance departures. Bibas, supra note 85, at 137–39.
152. See supra Part III.A.
153. William Stuntz has compellingly described the natural tendency to constantly
increase the number of crimes on the books to the point where the criminal code is so broad
that it covers an astonishing array of activities, to the point where the penal code becomes
almost indeterminate. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505, 534, 542−43, 547−58 (2001). What I critique here is distinct but parallel to that
analysis; I am making the same argument as to Congress’s policy goals as articulated in statute.
The two intersect, of course; those policy goals at times will serve as justification for expanding
the penal code as well as increasing guideline ranges.
154. See Altschuler, supra note 148, at 100−03.
155. See supra Part II.B.1.f.
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are left with a guideline structure created with no clear relationship
to its founding principles (other, perhaps, than uniformity), and
which continues to function without an ability to measure a
relationship to those founding principles.
The sentencing guidelines are not a success. The goals they aim
to meet are so numerous that they defy any effort to analyze data
that may measure failure or success.157 Much like a bizarre game of
Chinese checkers that thirty-one people can play at the same time, it
is extremely difficult to figure out what is going on.
2. Harshness in the service of nothing
Because the guidelines are pointless, they cannot be rational in
relationship to any discrete sentencing goal. Yet, in striving for
uniformity, Congress has made them uniformly harsh. On a
playground, the combination of irrationality combined with
harshness is a bully looking to pick on those with less power. The
same combination in our federal sentencing scheme produces a
system, a machine really, that resembles that playground bully—
unreasoning, uncompassionate, and unprincipled.
This moral relativism born of too many goals is especially sad in
an era where very often criminal law is said to be about “sending
messages.”158 Those signals are, or should be, moral signals about
the bounds of socially acceptable behavior, and the price to be paid
for differentiated acts (which is what the guidelines are about—
normative price-setting for specific wrongful acts). Included in these
signals are messages about why an act is especially reprehensible.
Without a set of clear policy goals behind it, sentencing practice loses
the value of this important function. In fact, it seems that if there is
one message conveyed to the public under the contemporary
scheme, it is one of simple retribution for any type of crime, a
156. Amy Baron-Evans, The Continuing Struggle for Just, Effective and Constitutional
Sentencing After United States v. Booker: Why and How the Guidelines Do Not Comply With §
3553(a), CHAMPION, Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 32, 34−35.
157. The problem is not a simple lack of data relative to sentencing—the Sentencing
Commission has produced thousands of pages of data relative to sentencing in the federal
courts. See United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Statistics by State,
District, and Circuit, http://www.ussc.gov/linktojp.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2009). Rather,
the problem is that it is impossible to analyze that data so that it can reveal how any one of the
tens of policy goals are being fulfilled.
158. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413,
480 (1999); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18−27 (2000).
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message inconsistent with much (though certainly not all) of what
Congress has articulated as the policy goals159 of the guidelines.160
In particular, this perceived message of widespread, consistent,
and harsh retribution is at odds with the parsimony principle that
Congress has established as the fulcrum of a trial court’s sentencing
mechanism.161 This provision specifically demands that a sentencing
judge impose a sentence “not greater than necessary” to accomplish
the aims of the four traditional sentencing goals.162 Beyond the
necessary balancing between sentencing goals and parsimony, the
claim that retribution is the primary goal ignores the other goals that
can often be seen pulling the other way—including the findings of
social science,163 the idea of fairness (either procedural or
substantive),164 the effect of mass incarceration on prison
populations,165 the need to encourage restitution,166 and the benefits
given to often highly culpable cooperators under guideline §
5K1.1.167
This cry of retribution, while not supported by Congress’s
articulated sentencing goals as a whole, does accurately reflect the
general harshness of the federal scheme.168 Were the guidelines to be
underpinned by a reasonable and understandable principle or set of
principles, harshness (or surprising lenience) might be a cost worth
paying. However, when we cannot say that uniformity or any other
goal is being achieved, it may be time to seek change.

159. See supra Part II.
160. In addition, this message is inconsistent with what highly selective federal
prosecutors actually do. Federal prosecutors handle less than 5% of the nation’s felonies, with
the rest going to the state systems. The great majority of these could have been tried at either
the state or federal level. See Stuntz, supra note 153, at 542−43 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS—1988,
at 387−88 tbl.5.6 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1999)).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
162. Id.
163. See supra Part II.B.1.c.
164. See supra Part II.B.1.e.
165. See supra Part II.B.1.j.
166. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
167. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
168. For a good description of the mechanisms that lead to harsher sentences in the
federal system, see Frank O. Bowman III, Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious History
and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Sentencing Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 387−91
(2004).
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IV. INTO THE POINTLESS FOREST
If the guideline system is pointless and amoral, should it matter
that it is no longer mandatory?169 Certainly, the effects of Booker
may, over time, mitigate some of the harms created by the guidelines
by allowing sentencing judges more discretion. However, the
sentencing guidelines are still at the center of the process of
sentencing in federal court. As Booker made clear, the mechanisms of
sentencing are the same—including revision of the guidelines and
calculation of a guideline range in nearly every case.170 Therefore, it is
fair to say that the guidelines have less authority but still play a major
role in federal sentencing. The critique above171 applies regardless of
whether the guidelines are mandatory, advisory, or somewhere in
between. Do we want an irrational and pointless construct at the
center of our sentencing structure, even if it is not strictly
mandatory? I would hope not. So long as the guidelines remain at
the center of the mechanism for sentencing, they should be tethered
to a few understandable and easily articulated principles.
If there is to be change (and there should), it seems there are
three options: (1) abolish the guidelines and return to the system
that existed before they were created; (2) keep the guidelines as they
are but change the underlying policy statements; or (3) start over
and build new guidelines on top of a few, well-articulated policy
goals.
First, Congress could scrap the guidelines altogether and go back
to a system in which judges have unguided discretion within broad
statutory limits. While this might solve some of the problems
associated with the system as it exists, it seems politically unlikely
given the sentiment in Congress for retaining some measure of
uniformity in federal sentencing.
A second option would be for Congress to restrict the statutory
goals of sentencing to the traditional goals (deterrence, retribution,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation) while leaving the guidelines in
place, hoping that they evolve into something better over time. One
could read this Article (at least up to this point) as an argument for
doing exactly that—limiting the sentencing policy goals to a few
understandable points. However, while the need for fewer and
169. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265−68 (2005).
170. Id. at 264−65.
171. See supra Parts II & III.
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simpler goals is certainly a part of my argument, redefining the goals
of sentencing would not make much sense unless the guidelines
themselves were either revised or removed from federal sentencing.
Unfortunately, the guidelines are now filled with the numerical
results of thousands of actions taken on behalf of one or another of
the goals described above. It would be impossible to undo the moral
relativism of the guidelines system without taking them apart and
remaking them in a better and more understandable fashion.
Finally, Congress could start the process over again with fewer
goals and advisory guidelines written from scratch. If we are to have
principled, understandable sentencing in the federal courts, this
might be the single best politically palatable option.
A. A Project for Principles: Rewrite the Guidelines
Unless we are comfortable with the amoral strictness of the
guidelines we have, they must be remade. But, is it possible to take
apart the guidelines and remake them? To do so would require a
massive effort involving a new guideline commission charged with
coming up with federal sentencing guidelines from scratch. Yet still,
this undertaking might be worthwhile. A second-generation
sentencing commission starting with a clean sheet of paper would
have significant advantages over the group that came up with the
first edition.
For one, a new founding commission would have the advantage
of learning from the problems with the current guidelines. For
example, it would allow for the thorough rethinking of charge versus
real-offense conduct as the basis for sentencing. The original
Sentencing Commission’s compromise on this issue allowing a judge
to consider relevant conduct, including acquitted conduct,172 has
been (properly) subjected to withering criticism for importing into
the current system, without context, a single feature of a bygone era
in which rehabilitation was a primary goal of sentencing.173 In
relation to this, a new commission would have the benefit of the
reams of data gathered by the Sentencing Commission staff over the

172. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2007).
173. Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits
on the Discretion of Sentences, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1712−13 (1992); Osler, Must Have Got
Lost, supra note 16, at 669−70.
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past two decades. This, combined with other social science data,
would broaden the perspective of these second-generation framers.
Second, the new commission would be positioned to learn from
the examples provided by several states with advisory guidelines in
place. The first Commission looked only at the example of
Minnesota and Washington, both of whom had fairly new guideline
regimes at that time and seemed to summarily reject them as too
simplistic.174 Now, however, there have been two decades of
guideline experiments in a number of states, all of which provide
trial-and-error lessons for a new federal system.
Third, starting from scratch at this point would allow the new
commission to draw from the body of scholarship that has developed
since the mid-1980s by writers such as Douglas Berman, Michael
O’Hear, Frank Bowman, Steven Chanenson, and Stephanos Bibas,
each of whom has had a significant impact on the development of
this field.175
Finally, a new commission would have the advantage of a limited
and understandable group of directive principles. Part of the
legislation creating a new guideline Commission could start by
phasing out 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 28 U.S.C. § 991 and 28 U.S.C. §
994 in favor of a much briefer articulation of goals. It might be that
the parsimony provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), plus the four
traditional sentencing goals, would serve this purpose176 if Congress
expressly made these policies the basis for guidelines in an active way,
freed from the command to place sharp limits on judges and increase
sentences.
B. Change as the Pointless Forest
Predictably, there are those who would oppose any change in the
essential structure of the sentencing guidelines, especially given the
strong likelihood that the revision would result in greater judicial
discretion. Those who gain the most from the current regime (that
is, the Department of Justice) would raise the strongest objections.
The present system gives tremendous power in the form of discretion
174. Breyer, supra note 63, at 3.
175. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 10; Bibas, supra note 85; Bowman, supra note 47;
Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. L. REV. 175 (2005);
O’Hear, supra note 31.
176. Like the parsimony provision, the four traditional goals are currently contained in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
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to federal prosecutors,177 who can manipulate sentences by their
charging decisions, their choices regarding cooperation, and their
ability to control information going to the probation officer who
prepares the presentence investigation report. The risk of losing that
power might cause the Department of Justice to employ its
significant lobbying abilities178 to stop any such change.
If Congress seriously considered rewriting the guidelines, it is
likely that the Department of Justice would argue, in part, that
changing the current system in a way that might give judges more
discretion would bring back disparities and destroy uniformity. There
are many counter-arguments to this, of course, including some
already articulated in this Article: the guidelines have increased, not
decreased, disparity,179 and prosecutors themselves create great
disparities under the current system.180 The best counter-argument
to the Department of Justice would be, however, that the guidelines
must be reformed if they are to give us hope for principled justice
through federal criminal law.
V. CONCLUSION
Predicting this fight over uniformity and judicial discretion, of
course, brings us back to the Land of Point and Harry Nilsson’s acid
trip. Remember that Oblio and Arrow were banished to the pointless
forest, a place greatly feared by the pointy-headed types in the Land
of Point. Once there, though, Oblio realized that the Land of Point
was not what he expected:
[O]ne of the first things Oblio and Arrow noticed about the
Pointless Forest was that all the leaves on all the trees had
points, and all the trees had points. In fact, even the branches
of all the trees pointed in different directions, which seemed
a little strange for a pointless forest.181

177. Albert Altschuler has described the employment of this discretion as being in the
nature of the “good cop” to Congress’s mean “bad cop.” Altschuler, supra note 148, at
112−13.
178. Stuntz, supra note 153, at 534.
179. Altschuler, supra note 148, at 101−02.
180. Id. at 100−02; Bibas, supra note 85, at 137−45.
181. HARRY NILSSON, THE POINT! (BMG Entm’t 1970), available at
http://www.bluegrass.kctcs.edu/LCC/ENG/101nil.html.
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The critics of increasing judicial discretion are correct in saying
that it creates disparities—that the branches (judges) do tend to
point in different directions. Judges differ, and they do so in
substantive and occasionally troubling ways. Nonetheless, they tend
to sentence on principles that do directly bear on the question at
hand—that is, they have a concrete reason for doing what they have
chosen with a given defendant. There will be, in other words, at least
one principle at play that directly underlies the crafting of the
sentence, a principle that is going to be articulated, explained, and
connected expressly to the result by that judge.182 In short, the
sentence that results from the discretion of a judge has a point, even
if it is not the same point another judge might make in similar
circumstances. While this does risk endangering the (perhaps false)
perception of uniformity under the guidelines, it at least is better
than our current guideline-driven system, which is so awash in
conflicting policy goals that a principled point is not even possible.
The present guidelines, even in advisory form, are hopelessly
amoral because they are not informed by understandable, simple
policy goals. If legislative will requires that we have guidelines, the
guidelines we have now need to be scrapped and reformed from the
ground up. Doing so will likely create greater judicial discretion, but
for most Americans, I suspect that some disparity is an acceptable
cost for the hope of a sentencing system with actual principles at
play.
It may seem harsh to describe Congress’s actions as an “acid
trip,” but the analogy is not entirely inapt. For instance, one
symptom of LSD183 use is the “fear of losing control.”184 It is
indisputable that if a new guideline system was put into place, it
might lessen Congress’s control relative to sentencing judges.
However, this shift is necessary if we are to regain moral credibility in
sentencing.

182. As Judge Cabranes put it, when a judge has discretion “[j]udgment proceeds from
principles. These principles can and should be stated, rationally discussed, attacked, and
defended.” STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 82.
183. Lysergic acid diethylamide.
184. NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, NIDA INFOFACTS: HALLUCINOGENS:
LSD, PEYOTE, PSILOCYBIN, AND PCP 3 (2008), http://www.nida.nih.gov/pdf/
infofacts/Hallucinogens08.pdf.
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